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Lecture 4  
 
A Clash of Civilizations?   
 
 
 
 
 
At the end of the last lecture, I concurred with those who insist on the 
centrality of terror to any analysis of terrorism. It is, I agreed, the attempt to instil fear 
that serves in no small part to distinguish terrorism from other kinds of murderous and 
bloody acts. However, even if we agree that fear is central to any analysis of 
terrorism, it is still important to know what the fear is a fear of, and here I noted 
Jessica Stern’s claim that the fear may be the fear that our entire system of values (the 
values of western liberal democracy) are under attack. To recall her claim: ‘the 
terrorism we face is not only a response to political grievances, as was common in the 
1960s and 1970s, and which might in principle be remediable. It is a response to a 
“God-shaped hole” in modern culture’. Stern’s analysis is reminiscent of Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. It suggests that the reason modern 
terrorism is not remediable in principle is because we are no longer dealing with 
actors who seek political remedy, but rather with actors who seek to undermine the 
entire value system (the civilization) of which we , in western liberal democracies, are 
a part.  
In this final lecture I will first say a bit more about what the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ thesis is, and I will then ask whether the thesis is one which really does - 
as is sometimes alleged - destroy the possibility of toleration and peaceful co-
 50
existence. The pattern of argument here is very similar to the pattern I have deployed 
in previous lectures: in the first lecture I noted the widespread belief that salvationist 
conceptions of religion are incompatible with toleration, but in the second lecture I 
tried to show that, in fact, this widespread belief is false and that salvationist 
conceptions of religion are (or at least can be) compatible with toleration. Belief in 
one true God does not necessarily destroy the possibility of toleration. Or so I argued. 
Similarly here, I will first say why the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is thought to be 
incompatible with toleration, and I will then try to show that it can, after all, 
accommodate toleration. In both cases, the solution lies, I believe, in learning from 
our history, and especially from the history of political thought. So, in the first case, 
explaining how salvationist religion might be compatible with toleration involved 
looking back to 17th century England and to the work of John Locke; in this case, 
showing how the clash of civilizations thesis is compatible with toleration involves 
looking back to 16th century Florence and to the work of Niccolo Machiavelli. I begin, 
however, by saying a bit more about what the clash of civilizations thesis is and why 
it is thought to render religious toleration and peaceful co-existence impossible, or at 
least extremely difficult.  
 
 
 
The Clash of Civilizations  
Samuel Huntington’s thesis was first advanced in his 1993 article ‘A Clash of 
Civilizations?’ and then elaborated in his 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations and 
the Remaking of World Order. The thesis is succinctly stated by Huntington himself 
when, in the original article, he writes:  
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  The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily 
ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and 
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the 
most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global 
politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The 
clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between 
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (Huntington, 1993, p.22, 
emphasis added).   
 
And it is clear that, for Huntington, ‘civilizations’ are in large part distinguished 
religiously. So the clash of civilizations is (or will be) the clash of religions. More 
accurately, it will be (or is) the clash between, as the slogan has it, ‘the West and the 
Rest’. And in speaking of ‘the Rest’ Huntington is thinking mainly (though not 
exclusively) of Islam.  
 The “clash of civilizations” thesis has been controversial and influential in 
equal measure. Huntington has been ‘credited’ with predicting the rise of religious 
terrorism that has characterized the 21st century, but he has also been accused of 
having a ‘foggy’ perception of world history, a ‘vague’ notion of what counts as a 
civilization, and a ‘reckless’ attitude towards serious problems of modern politics. 
Thus, with thinly veiled contempt, Edward Said writes:  
 
Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make “civilizations” and 
“identities” into what they are not: shut-down, sealed-off entities that have 
been purged of the myriad currents and counter-currents that animate human 
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history, and that over centuries have made it possible for that history not only 
to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of 
exchange, cross-fertilization, and sharing. This far less visible history is 
ignored in the rush to highlight the ludicrously compressed and constricted 
warfare that the “clash of civilizations” argues is the reality. (Said, 2001) 
 
And in similar vein, the Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen comments:  
 
 The increasing tendency to overlook the many identities that any human being 
has and to try to classify human beings according to a single allegedly pre-
eminent religious identity is an intellectual confusion that can animate 
dangerous divisiveness …. Huntington contrasts Western civilization with 
“Islamic civilization”, “Hindu civilization”, “Buddhist civilization”, and so on. 
The alleged confrontations of religious differences are incorporated into a 
sharply carpentered vision of hardened divisiveness. (Sen, 2006)  
 
Both Said and Sen discern in Huntington’s thesis an historical and ideological naiveté, 
which assumes that people are largely, and probably immutably, defined by their 
religion, and which ignores both the malleability of identities and the significance of 
factors other than religion (race, gender, ethnicity, class, language, and so on) in the 
creation of identities which are not monolithic but multi-faceted. To put the point 
bluntly: where Huntington sees the world and its people as deeply divided along 
religious lines, Said and Sen insist that religion is just one factor among many which 
contribute to our sense of who we are and where we belong.  
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Moreover, and crucially for my purposes, having put forward the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ thesis, Huntington goes on to assert that its political implications are 
such as to require the West to ‘maintain the economic and military power necessary to 
protect its interests in relation to these [other] civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993, p.49). 
In other words, we in the West must arm ourselves against other civilizations and 
ensure that we have the military and economic power to protect ourselves against 
them. As one reviewer has noted:  
 
Though he denies it, the political implication of Huntington's thesis is 
isolationism …. His advice for the Western powers is to draw closer together, 
maintain their strength, and, above all, recognize "that Western intervention in 
the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source 
of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world” 
(Pipes, 1997, p. 64)   
 
The clash of civilizations, then, enjoins separatism and isolationism.  
This is, to put it mildly, a rather dispiriting conclusion and also, many have claimed, 
one that has served as something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: once people are 
encouraged to see conflicts as reflecting clashes of civilizations, permanent fault lines, 
or immutable allegiances to ultimate but conflicting religious convictions, then the 
prospects for coexistence seem pretty poor. It looks as if the best we can do is to 
batten down the hatches, arm ourselves against the enemy, and try to preserve what is 
valuable to us, while leaving ‘them’ to sort out their own affairs. Is that, then, what 
awaits us in a world post 9/11?  
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 I want to suggest that it is not – or at least that it need not be. But I want to do 
that, not by denying the clash of civilizations thesis, but by accepting it and arguing 
that, even if it is true, there is still room for toleration and peaceful co-existence rather 
than the isolationism and separatism to which Huntington appears to be committed. 
So, just as I argued that even if we have salvationist religious convictions, toleration is 
still possible, so here I want to argue that even if the clash of civilizations thesis is 
true (which it may not be), toleration is still possible. The argument can best be made 
through an analysis of the work of a 16th century Florentine writer and politician - 
Niccolo Machiavelli.  
 
 
 
Machiavelli  
Comparatively little is known about Machiavelli’s life, but the bare bones are that he 
was born in Florence in May of 1469, educated in the humanist tradition (which was 
the favoured education for aspiring politicians and which emphasised the study of 
Latin, rhetoric, ancient history, and moral philosophy), and subsequently appointed 
Second Chancellor of the Republic of Florence under the patronage of Piero Soderini. 
In his capacity as Second Chancellor, Machiavelli travelled extensively and rubbed 
shoulders with many of the great figures of his day, including Cesare Borgia, Louis 
XII, and members of the Medici family. However, in 1512 the Florentine republic was 
dissolved (or, more accurately, defeated), and the Medici returned to power. With the 
collapse of the Republic came the collapse of Machiavelli’s political career. He was 
dismissed from his post, he spent some time in internal exile, he was then imprisoned 
for a period during which time he was tortured (‘put to the question’) and, on release 
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from prison, he retired to a small property at San Casciano on the outskirts of 
Florence. He never regained public office, though he fervently wished to do so, and 
he died on 22 June 1527.  
There are two features of Machiavelli’s life and times that I want to note here 
because they are, I think, important to an understanding of his work and to the 
interpretation of his work which I want to propose: the first, and most familiar, feature 
is that Machiavelli had considerable personal experience of politics. He knew how 
politics worked ‘on the ground’; he knew how people came to power, how they 
retained power, and (most important of all) how they lost power. The second point is 
that Machiavelli’s world was not only politically tumultuous but was also a world 
which lurched, rather unpredictably, between different moral, religious, and political 
extremes. As one commentator has put it: ‘Florence [at the time of Machiavelli] was a 
city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by the fervent and austere 
Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving Lorenzo [de Medici]’ (Marriott, 2004). 
I will return to this quotation in a few moments.  
What, then, of Machiavelli’s work? Probably his most famous work is a short 
book called The Prince. The book was written in 1513-14 (after Machiavelli’s fall 
from political office) and it is a book which has inspired hundreds of different 
interpretations. I will focus on two: the first is a very familiar (possibly even the 
standard) interpretation; the second is an interpretation which I think is more 
interesting (and more useful for my purposes) because it offers a way of explaining 
how the ‘clash of civilizations’ may be compatible with the rise of toleration.  
Just to recap, then, my aim here is to show how, even if the clash of 
civilizations thesis is true, toleration may still be possible, ands to do that via an 
interpretation of Machiavelli’s The Prince. So, Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration 
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enables us to see that toleration is possible even if there is one true God and salvation 
depends on doing what is pleasing to Him. Similarly, Machiavelli’s The Prince 
enables us to see that toleration is possible even if the differences between ‘the West 
and the Rest’ constitute a clash of civilizations. (It does not, of course, follow that 
Machiavelli himself would welcome this implication of his theory.)  
I will begin by outlining a very familiar interpretation of The Prince but, for 
reasons I have indicated, I am not going to dwell on that interpretation; it is here 
primarily for reasons of contrast. This, familiar, interpretation is an interpretation of 
Machiavelli as political realist.  
 
 
Machiavelli as Political Realist
The Prince was written after Machiavelli’s fall from political office and at time when 
he was trying to curry favour with the new ruler (the new prince). Indeed, it is offered 
as a piece of advice to a new ruler about how he should conduct himself if he wishes 
to retain office and to preside over a flourishing state. And the advice seems to be 
that, if he is to succeed in politics, the prince (ruler) must be prepared to act 
immorally. Although it is (of course) better if the prince acts honestly, kindly and 
decently, the world is such, Machiavelli says, that this will not always be possible and 
sometimes (perhaps often) rulers will be required to deceive, to be cruel, and to break 
their promises if they are to retain their positions as rulers.  
Here are just a few extracts from The Prince which give the flavour of 
Machiavelli’s position: ‘a wise ruler cannot, nor ought he, to keep his promises when 
that may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to make the 
promise no longer exist. If men were entirely good, this advice would not hold, but 
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because they are bad and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to keep 
faith with them’. Or again, ‘it is necessary for a prince wishing to retain power to 
know how to do wrong and to make use of that knowledge as and when necessary’. 
And finally, ‘one prince [Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor] of the present time 
never preaches anything but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and 
either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a 
time’  (Machiavelli, 1977). 
This, then, is Machiavelli the realist, the thinker who, more than any other, 
recognises that if rulers mean to stay in power they must be prepared to be 
hypocritical, untrustworthy, ruthless, deceitful, and immoral. ‘Politics’ as Thomas 
Nagel has put it,  ‘selects for ruthlessness’, and the claim that politicians must be 
ruthless is nowhere more stridently and uncompromisingly made than in the works of 
Machiavelli (Nagel, 1979). However, and as indicated, I don’t want to dwell on that 
interpretation here because there is, I think, a more interesting interpretation of The 
Prince, one which does not focus on Machiavelli the political realist, but rather on 
Machiavelli the value pluralist. It is in Machiavelli’s pluralism that we find the clash 
of civilizations thesis foreshadowed and its practical implications spelled out in ways 
that are illuminating for those of us who live in the world post 9/11. Or so I shall 
suggest.  
 
 
Machiavelli and the Clash of Civilizations
 In an article entitled ‘The Question of Machiavelli’ Isaiah Berlin notes that ‘there is 
something peculiarly disturbing about what Machiavelli said or implied … something 
that has caused profound and lasting uneasiness’ through the ages. Many claim that 
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the unease is caused by Machiavelli’s realism – by his belief (the belief identified a 
few moments ago) that politics demands ruthlessness, dishonesty, and duplicity, but 
Berlin doubts that this can be the full story. ‘The fact that the wicked flourish’ he says 
‘has never been very remote from the consciousness of mankind. The Bible, 
Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle … all these had cast enough light on political 
realities to shock the credulous and naïve out of uncritical idealism’ (Berlin, 1977, 
pp.206-207).  
So, if it is not the realism, what is it that makes Machiavelli’s views so 
alarming, disturbing and terrifying – so erschreckend, to use Berlin’s word? The 
answer comes in two parts, both of which have implications for the central question of 
this lecture: the first part of the answer is that Machiavelli’s views are disturbing 
because, in the end, he is not saying that, in order to be successful, the politician must 
be willing to do what is morally wrong. On the contrary, he is saying that when the 
politician lies, deceives, or cheats he is not abandoning morality in order to do what is 
politically necessary; he is in fact embracing a different, but no less compelling 
morality – the morality of politics itself. As Berlin explains: ‘Machiavelli’s values are 
not instrumental but moral and ultimate, and he calls for great sacrifices in their name 
…. The moral ideal for which he thinks no sacrifice is too great – the welfare of the 
patria (the homeland, the city) – is for him the highest form of social existence’ 
(Berlin, 1977, p.216). In other words, the suggestion is that in pursuing the life of 
politics - in lying, deceiving, cheating, and acting ruthlessly - the politician does what 
is morally required by his calling. Of course this morality (the morality of politics) is 
different from and incompatible with ordinary (Christian) morality, but it is a morality 
nonetheless, not merely a pragmatic response to the vagaries of the world, nor merely 
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a strategy which the politician adopts in order to secure his own ambitious or self-
centred ends.   
 This, then, is the first disturbing (erschreckend) feature of Machiavelli’s 
account: it is an account according to which there may be more than one morality – 
more than one moral world: the politician (prince) has moral values quite distinct 
from, and often inconsistent with, the moral values of the private person, and it is 
therefore not true to say that the prince is morally bad and the private person morally 
good – or vice versa. What is true is that each kind of life has its own moral values, 
but they are different and indeed conflicting values. They cannot be combined in a 
single life, and therefore a choice must be made between them.  
 Additionally (and this is the second disturbing feature of Machiavelli’s 
account) there may, ultimately, be no way of making a choice between them because, 
although they conflict one with another, each way of life, each set of values, ‘has 
much, indeed everything’; to be said for it, so any choice will, of necessity, involve 
the loss of some value or values. There is no single best way of living.  As Berlin puts 
it:  
  
 What has been shown by Machiavelli… is not that men profess one thing and 
do another (although no doubt he shows this, too) but that when they assume 
that the two ideals are compatible, or perhaps are even one and the same ideal, 
they are guilty of bad faith. Machiavelli calls the bluff not just of official 
morality – the hypocrisies of ordinary life – but of one of the foundations of 
the western philosophical tradition, the belief in the ultimate compatibility of 
all genuine values. His own withers are unwrung. He has made his choice. He 
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seems wholly unworried by, indeed scarcely aware of, parting company with 
traditional Western morality. (Berlin, 1977, p. 229)  
 
So, what is disturbing about Machiavelli is his unflinching recognition that there are 
many different moral systems (many different moral worlds), that they are 
incompatible one with another, and that there is no way of choosing between them. 
No right answer to the question ‘how should one live?’. And this does seem to be very 
close to the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. Of course, in Machiavelli it is not spelled 
out through the vocabulary of ‘the West and the Rest’, but conceptually it just is the 
claim that there are different, conflicting, and irreconcilable world views, and that 
there is no way of bringing them into harmony one with another.  
 Let me try to dramatize this point by returning to a quotation given earlier: 
‘Florence [at the time of Machiavelli] was a city with two opposite currents of life, 
one directed by the fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving 
Lorenzo [de Medici]’ (Marriott, 2004). Savonarola was a Dominican monk who was 
appalled by the ostentation and profligacy of the Medici court. During the carnival of 
1497 he organized bonfires in the Piazza della Signoria on which the people of 
Florence were encouraged to burn their luxuries (vanities) and return to a more 
simple, frugal and god-fearing style of life. These were the bonfires of the vanities. 
They rose 15 storeys high and on them were burned all the baubles and trinkets and 
fripperies of Florentine decadence: mirrors, carnival masks, ornaments, cards, dice, 
perfume, cosmetics. And most of the paintings of Botticelli …  
The values of the Medici (ostentation, self-confidence, luxury) were in conflict 
with the values of Savonarola (simplicity, austerity, frugality, and humility). There 
was (and is) no way of reconciling these two sets of values, but neither is it true that 
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one set of values is entirely right and the other wrong. If we choose between them, as 
we must, then there will be loss either way. Without self-confidence, brashness, and 
ostentation, it is doubtful whether the great art of Renaissance Italy would have been 
possible. As Stuart Hampshire puts it:  
 
The great civilizations of the past have not been created and sustained by 
quietly virtuous people with a delicate sense of justice. On the contrary, they 
have generally been the products, or by-products, of overweening ambition 
and a large appetite for power and glory. (Hampshire, 1989, p.161).  
 
Or as Berlin puts :  
 
 If Machiavelli is right, if it is in principle (or in fact: the frontier seems dim) 
impossible to be morally good and do one’s duty as this was conceived by 
common European, and especially Christian, ethics, and at the same time build 
Sparta or Periclean Athens, or the Rome of the Republic or even of the 
Antonines, then a conclusion of the first importance follows: that the belief 
that the correct, objectively valid solution to the question of how men should 
live can in principle be discovered is itself, in principle, not true. This was a 
truly erschrekend proposition. (Berlin, 1977, pp.224-225).  
 
The point is the same: the ‘quiet’ virtues - virtues of humility, decency, and honesty - 
are not virtues that will build a great city or nurture a great civilization. For that, what 
is required is self-confidence, an appetite for power, and ambition. But self 
confidence and ambition are incompatible with humility and honesty. There is a clash 
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of values and when, as in 16th century Florence, ‘two opposite currents of life’ 
converge, there is something like a clash of civilizations. Which is simply to say: 
there is a clash of equally ultimate, equally compelling, yet incompatible moral 
worlds.   
 However, if all this is true – if values really are plural and conflicting in the 
deep way implied by this interpretation of Machiavelli, then what are the prospects for 
toleration and peaceful co-existence? Samuel Huntington seems to think that the 
prospects are gloomy, and (as noted earlier) major commentators such as Said and 
Sen agree, and are appalled. They – and Huntington – seem convinced that if the clash 
of civilizations thesis is true, then we are doomed to isolationism and separatism.  
I find this deeply puzzling: it may well be true, as Said, Sen, and others allege, 
that Huntington has a very crude understanding of history and a simplistic notion of 
the many different factors that go to make up someone’s identity or sense of who they 
are, but insofar as his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is a thesis about the way in which 
values conflict and about the possibility that they may not, ultimately, be reconcilable 
one with another, it is the very starting point of liberal political philosophy and indeed 
of the commitment to toleration that has long been associated with it. John Rawls tells 
us that liberalism’s first question is ‘how is it  possible that there may exist over time 
a stable and just society of  free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?’ (Rawls, 1993, p.xviii) and, as we have 
seen, the historical origins of liberalism lie in the religious conflict which 
characterized 17th century Europe and which were ultimately resolved, not by the 
discovery of a single, ‘true’ answer, but by a recognition that, since disagreement and 
conflict were not going to go away, they should be contained through policies of 
toleration. In other words, Huntington’s insistence on the depth of disagreement that 
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divides ‘the West’ from ‘the Rest’ is not, in itself, troubling. On the contrary, it was 
the recognition of deep disagreement that gave us liberalism in the first place, and it is 
the acknowledgement (Rawls’s acknowledgement) that that disagreement is not going 
to go away, that should reinforce our commitment to liberal values. They need not, 
and should not, encourage us to embrace isolationism and separatism. On the 
contrary, they should encourage us to look for ways in which we might secure 
peaceful co-existence and toleration.  
Of course, people differ about the extent and depth of disagreement that is 
compatible with peaceful coexistence and toleration, but even if Machiavelli is right 
and the depth of difference is very great indeed, there is still no reason to be 
completely pessimistic. In the concluding sentences of ‘The Question of Machiavelli’ 
Berlin writes:  
 
 So long as only one ideal is the true goal, it will always seem to men that no 
means can be too difficult, no price too high, to do whatever is required to 
realize the ultimate goal. Such certainty is one of the great justifications of 
fanaticism, compulsion, persecution…. If there is only one solution to the 
puzzle, then the only problems are: first how to find it, then how to realize it, 
and finally how to convert others to the solution by persuasion or force. But if 
this is not so, then the path is open to pluralism and toleration. Toleration is 
the product of the realization of the irreconcilability of equally dogmatic 
faiths, and the practical improbability of complete victory of one over another. 
(Berlin, 1977, p. 235) 
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In an earlier lecture I argued that, in fact, the belief that there is a single right answer 
need not destroy the possibility of toleration. Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration 
shows us that, even for salvationist religious believers, toleration is both possible and 
desirable. This is the lesson to be learned from Locke. In this lecture, I have tried to 
show that the belief that there is not a single solution does not destroy the possibility 
toleration either. Rather, it provides the context within which problems of toleration 
are to be understood and addressed. Either way, though, toleration remains a viable 
option even though its grounds and limits might be different in the two cases. Let me 
now conclude.  
 
 
Conclusion  
There is an almost irresistible temptation to believe that ‘everything changed’ on 9/11 
and that modern problems of religious violence and religiously-motivated terrorism 
are completely intractable and utterly different from anything hitherto experienced. It 
has been my aim in this series of lectures to suggest that that is not so. We have, in 
some extended sense, ‘been here before’, and we can learn, both practically and 
philosophically, from the ways in which problems similar to ours have been addressed 
in the past.  
The Freilich Foundation exists for the study of, and research into, the causes, 
the histories and the effects of ethnic, cultural, religious and sexual bigotry and 
animosity, and the exploration of how such intolerance can be combated and peaceful 
coexistence promoted. In these lectures I have tried to say something about the role 
that philosophy in general, and the history of philosophy in particular, may play in 
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helping us to achieve these aims. It has been an honour and a pleasure to deliver the 
Freilich Eminent Lectures for 2007.  
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